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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Second Department, held that the ex parte stay did not suspend the
effectiveness of the restraining notice but merely prevented the creditor from executing the judgment. A hearing was ordered on damages,
which were limited to the amount in the account at the time of the
service of the restraining notice plus costs.388
Since the judgment creditor in Nardone was not secured in any
way,189 the court's decision seems justified. As the court noted' 4 0 a
contrary holding would provide judgment debtors with a simple
means of freeing assets from restraint, thus frustrating the intent of
CPLR 5222.
CPLR 5240: Protectingthe judgment debtor from abuses of execution
and forced sales.
Pursuant to CPLR 5240, courts have broad discretionary powers
to deny, modify, or limit the use of any enforcement procedure.' 4'
Recently, the Supreme Court, Nassau County, applied this provision
in two cases to protect recipients of public assistance who were in
danger of losing their homes as a result of execution and forced sales.
In Hammond v. Econo-Car of the North Shore, Inc.,14 a creditor
of a husband executed against his interest in the family home. Because the creditor had not shown to the court's satisfaction that it had
tried to collect the $1400 debt from the delinquent husband first, and
because those to suffer most from execution would be the estranged
wife and children who were living in the home and being assisted by
public funds, the court restrained enforcement of the judgment. 14 The
court emphasized that the harassment effect of enforcement outweighed
"any substantive value in immediate occupancy rights to anyone out138 Id., 336 N.YS.2d at 827.
189 When a judgment is appealed, the judgment debtor may obtain an automatic
stay of execution by filing an undertaking as security pursuant to CPLR 5519. Authorities
contend that an automatic stay granted under CPLR 5519 suspends the effectiveness of a
restraining notice. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5222, commentary at 79 (1963); 6 WKM

5222.03. Their rationale is that the judgment creditor is adequately protected by the
debtor's undertaking. In Nardone, the judgment debtor was not appealing a judgment but
w.as seeking to open one. Therefore, there was no requirement that an undertaking be
filed.
140 40 App. Div. 2d at 697, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
141
See Dime Savings Bank v. Barnes, 67 Misc. 2d 837, 325 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1971) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REv.768,

791 (1972); 7B McKINNY's CPLR 5240, commentary at 203 (1963); 6 WK&-M

5240.01. Cf.

CPLR 3103.
142 71 Misc. 2d 546, 336 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (mem.).
143 The court cited Gilchrist v. Commercial Credit Corp., 66 Misc. 2d 791, 822
N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 355, 378 (1971), which paralleled the facts in this case and in which the

court emphasized the risk to the children of the loss of their home if the wife predeceased the husband.
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side the close family,"' 44 noting that "[t]he creditor's legitimate security
interest is really protected by its judgment lien."'145
Holmes v. W. T. Grant,Inc. 146 involved a $500 judgment secured
against a husband and wife who lived with their four infants in a home
for which they received public assistance to satisfy the mortgage payments. While not commenting on the element of harassment in
enforcing the judgment by means of execution and sheriff's sale, the
court weighed the harm to the family against the benefit to the creditor and found that "an equitable priority exists in the continued use
of the property to house the needy family."' 4 7
In both cases, the judgments and resulting creditors' liens remained valid, but not immediately enforceable. 148 In Holmes, the
court ordered the husband and wife to pay monthly installments to
the creditor until the judgment, with interest, 149 is satisfied, and granted
the creditor leave to resume execution if they default in their payments. In Hammond, the creditor was advised to seek payment from
the husband or to wait until the property is sold, vacated, or vested in
him by right of survivorship before executing on his interest. 150
In staying enforcement, these cases comport with the legislative
intent and previous Nassau County Supreme Court decisions applying
CPLR 5240 liberally wherever debtors require its protection. 151
144 71 Misc. 2d at 548, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 495. Since it could not gain immediate
occupancy, the creditor would benefit only if the husband survived the wife or if the
property were sold, which it would be better able to pressure the wife into doing.
145 Id.
146 Id. 486, 336 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (mem.).

147 Id. at 488, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 603. The court cited Dime Savings Bank v. Barnes, 67
Misc. 2d 837, 325 N.YS.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971) (mern.), which also spoke of
equities favoring the debtor, who lived with her aged and sick mother and could not
afford to lose her home.
148 The effect on creditors was discussed in connection with the Gilchrist case in The
Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. Rrv. 355, 378 (1971), where it was noted that although
the judgment is merely frozen when a court refuses to allow enforcement, in effect, the
cancellation of the sale may approach "the point of divestiture of the creditor's substantive rights."
149 This is a condition frequently imposed when protective orders are issued pursuant
to CPLR 5240. See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5236, supp. commentary at 155 (1972); cf. Dime
Savings Bank v. Barnes, 67 Misc. 2d 837, 839, 325 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1971) (mem.).
150 71 Misc. 2d at 548, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
151 In Lee v. Community Capital Corp., 67 Misc. 2d 699, 701, 324 N.Y.S.2d 583, 584
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. Ray.
561, 578 (1972), where a $20,000 home would have been sold to satisfy an underlying debt
of several hundred dollars, the court noted:
In Nassau County the real property generally involves personal residences of small
debtors, the assignees [of the creditor] invariably selling the debtor's home at
public auction for a fraction of the market value. This pattern has evolved into a
practice reaching alarming proportions in Nassau and Suffolk counties; and this
court, by the present decision, hopes to terminate such practice, to prevent the
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ARTICLE 75 - ARBITRATION

CPLR 7503: Filing of notice of lien in violation of contractual lien
waiver provision does not constitute waiver of right to arbitration.
Prior to the enactment of section 35 of the Lien Law,152 filing a
notice of lien was held to constitute a waiver of the right to arbitration,15 3 and the opposing party was entitled to a stay of arbitration
under CPLR 7503.15 Since this rule was overturned by statute, 16
filing a notice of lien and commencing an action to foreclose on the
lien have been included within the protection of section 35.156
Difficulties have arisen where a contract contains a broad arbitration clause and a provision waiving the right to file a lien. In Sommer v. Anthony J. Quarant Contracting,Inc., 57 a contractor who filed
a notice of lien in violation of such an agreement later sought to enforce the arbitration provisions of the breached contract. Rejecting
several prior holdings, 58 the Appellate Division, First Department,
unanimously reversed a stay of arbitration and directed the parties to
proceed to arbitration. The court reasoned that the intent of section
35 was to protect a party's lien rights while allowing him to pursue
arbitration, and that "[t]o engraft an exception to the statute because
perpetuation of this injustice until the Legislature reviews the manifest inequities
resulting from this practice.
The court also suggested that CPLR 5236, which affords this enforcement remedy, be
revised to prevent the "legal chicanery" and "unjust forfeitures" resulting from forced
sales. Id. at 702, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
152 N.Y. LiaN Low § 35 (McKinney 1966).
153 Young v. Crescent Dev. Co., 240 N.Y. 244, 148 N.E. 510 (1925).
154 A different result is obtained where a notice of lien is filed after a demand for
arbitration. See In re Askovitz, 229 App. Div. 258, 241 N.Y.S. 394 (2nd Dep't 1930).
155 Manitt Constr. Corp. v. J.S. Plumbing & Heating Corp., 50 Misc. 2d 502, 270
N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966).
156A. Burgart, Inc. v. Foster-Lipkins Corp., 63 Misc. 2d 930, 313 N.YS.2d 831 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1970), aff'd mem., 38 App. Div. 2d 779, 328 N.Y.S.2d 856 (4th Dep't),
aff'd mem., 80 N.Y.2d 901, 287 N.E.2d 269, 335 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1972). "Implicit in the
right to file a lien is the right to continue it until completion of the arbitration proceedings." Id. at 931, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 832. Accord, In re Oxer, 36 Misc. 2d 314, 316, 233 N.Y..2d
697, 699 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962) (action to foreclose lien is necessary protective
measure in addition to arbitration). Sowalskie v. Cohoes Housing Authority, Inc., 69
Misc. 2d 665, 330 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1968), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 47 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 148, 178 (1972), has thus been discredited. Therein, the defendant successfully prevented a plaintiff who brought an action to foreclose a lien from
pursuing any remedy by (I) obtaining a stay of foreclosure because their contract had
provided for arbitration of all controversies, and (2) obtaining a stay of arbitration on
the ground of waiver.
157 40 App. Div. 2d 95, 337 N.YS.2d 957 (1st Dep't 1972) (per curiam).
158 Sowalskie v. Cohoes Housing Authority, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 665, 330 N.YS.2d 481
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1968); Manitt Constr. Corp. v. J.S. Plumbing & Heating Corp.,
50 Misc. 2d 502, 270 N.YS.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966). It is not dear from the
Sowalskie facts that a lien waiver provision was involved. Apparently, the court's underlying rationale was that foreclosure of a lien is not within the purview of Lien Law § 35.

